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want to divide the world into in groups and out groups. He suggests that 
such tendencies can only be overcome through the spiritual sustenance 
that genuine religion can provide.
At times Reitan claims that theism is the best guarantor of the ethico-
religious hope (51); at others he affirms that “more than one world view” 
can satisfy it (185). Throughout the book he does not always stick to his 
more modest claim, and sometimes argues as if his arguments for theism 
are more decisive than they are. Moreover, connections between the three 
principle reasons for belief he provides, the cosmological argument, the 
argument from religious experience, and the argument from ethical hope, 
are not explored in depth. The author does succeed in showing that attacks 
on faith by the New Atheists are based on both a very superficial under-
standing of religion and a failure to recognize that there are, indeed, rational 
grounds for faith. Moreover, Reitan does a refreshing job sketching what 
such a rational faith, based on a moral commitment to the good, looks like. 
A Metaphysics for the Mob: The Philosophy of George Berkeley, by John Russell 
Roberts. Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. xxii + 172. $55.00 (hardcover).
DALE JACQUETTE, University of Bern, Switzerland
A book, not as I had hoped, about ontology and organized crime; rather, 
John Russell Roberts’s study of George Berkeley’s eliminative immaterial-
ism, takes its title from Berkeley’s Philosophical Commentaries, I §405: “All 
things in the Scripture which side with the Vulgar against the Learned 
side with me also. I side in all things with the Mob.”
It is a puzzling statement. One, indeed, that has perplexed even those 
critics sympathetic to Berkeley’s empiricism, if not to his project as a whole, 
expressing his rejection of a non-thinking substratum of sensibilia and 
mind-independent things existing “without the mind.” Roberts proposes 
to explain the commonsense nature of Berkeley’s philosophy, and in the 
process tackles many other related topics in the background of Berkeley’s 
thought and in contemporary discussions of Berkeley and the problems 
with which he was engaged.
In the first half of the book, Roberts offers historical background to 
Berkeley’s immaterialism. In the second half, he applies the exposition of 
Berkeley’s ideas presented in the first part to an interesting choice of his-
torical and contemporary philosophical problems, including links to an 
extended form of Daniel C. Dennett’s concept of the intentional stance, 
the thorny issue of Berkeley’s relation to Malebranche’s occasionalism as 
a solution to the causal interaction problem for Cartesian substance dual-
ism, and Wilfrid Sellars’s distinction between the manifest and scientific 
images. Woven through this development of interrelated topics is Roberts’s 
motivation to extrapolate Berkeley’s positive doctrine of spirit, an important 
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lacuna in Berkeley’s writings, despite his efforts to mount a decisive refuta-
tion of mind-independent materialism, but to which Berkeley devotes only 
scant, virtually no, careful attention.
There is much to approve in Roberts’s inventive retelling of these topics 
in Berkeley, but there are also some significant difficulties. For present 
purposes, I shall highlight what I take to be some of the most noteworthy 
problems in his interpretation.
Roberts’s debunking of the supposedly widely accepted but false be-
cause incomplete attribution to Berkeley of the ontological slogan Esse est 
percipi appears to be directed at a straw man. We are never told in the text 
who exactly is supposed to have made such an admittedly incorrect and 
obviously inept attribution, beyond mentioning that beginning students 
have often succumbed to this mistaken catchphrase. No relevant citations 
are quoted at all, although it is not unthinkable that careless interpretations 
of Berkeley’s philosophy have been made and will continue to be made by 
misinformed commentators. Berkeley uses the phrase in A Treatise Con-
cerning the Principles of Human Knowledge I §3, but there he speaks explic-
itly only of the essence of ideas, when he says that ‘Their esse is percipi,’ 
rather than offering a Latin summary of all parts of his ontology in sum, 
as is clear throughout the text, and especially in I §89. Many if not most 
of Berkeley’s qualified readers have adopted some form of A. A. Luce’s 
formulation that Esse est percipi aut posse percipere (To be is to be perceived 
or a perceiver), and those who have focused on the Esse est percipi part of 
the slogan can usually be charitably be understood as concentrating for 
purposes of emphasis in a particular context on the ontology of ideas or 
their combination into physical entities in Berkeley without losing sight of 
the fact that perception implies a perceiver. This version, after all, agrees 
favorably with Berkeley’s metaphysics of active minds entertaining pas-
sive ideas, and Roberts offers homage in the book’s Acknowledgements to 
Luce as the “greatest of all Berkeley scholars” (iv). Roberts, however, never 
credits Luce or any other previous writers as having properly understood 
the two-part complementary nature of Berkeley’s ontology, whereas surely 
those who have misunderstood Berkeley on this fundamental point must 
surely be greatly in the minority compared to those who have read the 
texts critically and taken Berkeley at his word on this central doctrine of 
his metaphysics.
In what is certain to be widely regarded as the book’s most original 
albeit controversial interpretation, Roberts appeals to Dennett’s concept 
of the intentional stance and Sellars’s distinction between the manifest 
and scientific image to contemporize the Berkeleyan theme that persons, 
minds or spirits are ontically more basic than their ideas. While taking note 
of important differences between Berkeley and Dennett, Roberts finds it 
insightful to expand Dennett’s notion of intentional stance, extending it to 
what he refers to as the “personal stance” and even the “religious stance.” 
With respect to personal stance-taking in particular, Roberts writes: “Ac-
cording to Berkeley, the necessary precondition of having any kind of 
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knowledge at all is the adopting of the personal stance—not to this or that 
particular thing, but to reality as a whole” (83). The lengthy passage quoted 
immediately following this pronouncement by no means supports Roberts’s 
assertion. He continues: “external reality is an active thing, a mind, a will. 
It is God” (84). By “external reality” Roberts evidently does not mean 
what Berkeley would flatly reject as the “world without the mind,” but 
rather the thinking entity within which the assemblages of passive ideas 
that constitute the physical world are actively perceived. Still, it appears 
strange to invoke a spatial relation, of inclusion or exclusion, here, since 
for Berkeley all space and time, and hence all inside and outside, are 
within the mind. Moreover, identifying God in particular as the “exter-
nal reality” in Roberts’s idiom seems unwarranted, since Berkeley equally 
regards finite human minds as realities existing “beyond” or “outside” of 
the realm of physical objects construed as congeries of ideas, and equally 
inscrutable to other minds, including God’s.
Roberts later writes, referring to Sellars’s concept of the manifest image in 
relation to Berkeley’s ontology: “being a river or a tree is a way of being a per-
son” (127). Roberts notes an important discrepancy between the Sellarsian 
manifest image and Berkeley’s metaphysics, in that Sellars’s view allows 
persons to be perceptible, which Berkeley explicitly denies. Roberts never-
theless concludes: “the key link between the manifest image and Berkeley’s 
metaphysics lies not in a shared commitment to save the appearances but 
rather in the deeper fact that in both Berkeley’s metaphysics and in the man-
ifest image, the basic entities are persons” (128). The point is supposed to be 
that both Berkeley and Sellars—when discussing the manifest as opposed to 
the scientific image—make persons, minds or spirits, the fundamental ob-
jects of ontology. The fact that Sellars’s manifest image construes perceptible 
rivers and trees as persons is correctly discounted and properly emphasized 
by Roberts as an important difference. Indeed, Roberts devotes a large part 
of the latter half of the book to establishing these differences, although he 
thereby assumes a burden of argument that would never have been neces-
sary had he not introduced this unlikely analogy in the first place. Since 
the manifest image is supposed to be pre-scientific, Roberts thinks he has 
established the vital link whereby Berkeley’s metaphysics can be properly 
understood as commonsensical. Roberts, however, says nothing to counter 
the obvious objection that persons, minds or spirits need not be ontically 
more fundamental than their ideas, if, as in Schopenhauer and other later 
idealists, spirits and ideas as designated in their distinct terminologies are 
inter-implicative or inter-presuppositional. For these thinkers also there are 
no ideas without minds—but equally there are no minds without ideas. 
Which, then, ideas or minds, are supposed to be ontically more fundamen-
tal if one never exists without the other? Schopenhauer would insist that 
neither is ontically more basic, and Roberts gives us no reason to believe 
that Berkeley would disagree.
We might also wonder whether being pre-scientific is really akin to being 
commonsensical. The fact that some cultures have encouraged Dennett-like 
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intentional or personal stance-taking toward the physical world, reminis-
cent of tribal animisms and totemisms, and that they have considered such 
attitudes to be commonsensical, does not even remotely relate, say, Druid-
ism or native American attributions of personhood to natural objects and 
forces, to anything Berkeley actually says or needs to say. Can we seriously 
imagine Hylas, Philonous, or the man or woman on the street in eighteenth-
century Dublin or Cloyne, agreeing as a matter of common sense that rivers 
and trees are persons, or even ways of being a person? For that matter, is 
it reasonable to suppose that they would be inclined to admit that persons 
are ontically more fundamental than the physical substances of which their 
bodies are composed? A more orthodox, and, one might even say, more 
common sense interpretation that derives directly from Berkeley’s own 
explicit statements, understands his philosophy as commonsensical in the 
less adventitious sense that, once the implications of mind-independent 
materialism are fully explained, as both the Principles spells out and Three 
Dialogues dramatizes in fictional interchange, no person of sound judgment 
but lacking in philosophical prejudice or doctrinaire commitment would 
be inclined to accept it. There is no deep mystery about the sense in which 
Berkeley’s metaphysics is supposed to be commonsensical, a metaphysics 
for the mob, and hence no motivation for going beyond the texts in search 
of slim points of convergence with later thinkers like Sellars and Dennett. 
Berkeley tells us simply, frequently, and in no uncertain terms, that com-
mon sense reasoning will assent to immaterialism once the conceptual 
confusions in materialism are exposed.
Of further difficulties that might be criticized in Roberts’s argument, 
from my perspective, I shall mention only these. Roberts equates the mind’s 
faculties with its powers when he writes: “to say something is a ‘faculty’ of 
the mind is simply to say that it is a ‘power’ of the mind” (103). Now this 
is surely wrong. The faculty of calculation, for example, supports, among 
other things, the power of addition and division, or ability to add and di-
vide. We would nevertheless be hard-pressed to postulate distinct faculties 
for every special type of calculation. Since addition ≠ division, however, the 
power of addition ≠ the power of division. A person might happen to have 
one without the other, like a machine programmed in limited dedicated 
fashion as capable of adding but not dividing. It follows by transitivity 
of identity and modus tollens that the faculty of calculation, though clearly 
related to both the power of addition and the power of division, is itself 
distinct from those powers. If both powers of addition and division were 
identical to calculation, then, despite being distinct, they would, per impos-
sibile, need to be identical to the faculty of calculation.
Roberts interestingly claims that Berkeley solves the problem of the 
bundle theory of physical objects by appealing to the mind’s unity (28–33). 
This too is a doubtful attribution, for which firm textual support is lack-
ing in the book. Nor is it a particularly generous view to foist on the good 
Bishop, because it is not at all clear how the mind’s unity is supposed to 
help solve the original difficulty. Suppose that I see both a blue ball and a 
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crimson cube. The relevant Berkeleyan ideas of blue, ball or sphere, crim-
son, and cube are then all collectively in my particular unified mind at a 
certain point in time. What then unites the color blue with the ball shape 
and not with the cube shape, and the color crimson with the cube shape 
and not with the ball shape? The answer certainly cannot be my finite will, 
which Berkeley and Roberts agree is insufficiently efficacious. God’s will 
would better serve, but for this solution to have traction, we would need to 
invoke Berkeley’s distinction between the ectypal and archetypal existence 
of ideas respectively in finite minds and in God’s infinite mind. Roberts, 
remarkably, has nothing to say about this crucial distinction in Berkeley’s 
metaphysics of spirit, despite its being so manifestly essential to under-
standing Berkeley’s solutions to idealist puzzles about the sameness of 
physical objects seen from different perspectives as consisting of different 
ideas by different finite spirits at the same time.
Despite my misgivings, I recommend Roberts’s book as a thoughtful, 
sympathetic approach to Berkeley’s philosophy in its development of a 
descriptive rather than speculative metaphysics. Here I have focused pri-
marily on what I see as some of the sticking points in Roberts’s historical 
exposition. Roberts’s project is nonetheless to be commended for its con-
tribution to making Berkeley’s anti-materialistic idealism more relevant 
to today’s philosophical scene generally, and especially with respect to 
Berkeley’s philosophy of religion. Certainly, Berkeley thought of his under- 
mining of atheism to be every bit as important as his undermining of 
skepticism, grounded in what he understood to be common sense. Any-
one with serious interests in Berkeley’s philosophy and the eighteenth-
century European enlightenment will find much to appreciate in Roberts’s 
historical commentary.
The Agnostic Inquirer: Revelation from a Philosophical Standpoint, by Sandra 
Menssen and Thomas D. Sullivan. Eerdmans, 2007.
KAI-MAN KWAN, Hong Kong Baptist University
Menssen and Sullivan challenge the primacy of standard natural theology 
in philosophy of religion. Menssen and Sullivan use the phrase “standard 
natural theology” to refer to projects in natural theology that do not iden-
tify the content of revelatory claims as especially important evidence for 
the existence of a good God (45). The basic idea is that one “cannot obtain 
a convincing philosophical case for a revelatory claim without first obtain-
ing a probable case for a good God” (52). Menssen and Sullivan believe 
that standard natural theology is a handicapped project because it is not 
working with a full database. For example, this kind of natural theology 
“lands the agnostic inquirer in a quagmire of theodicy-building without 
adequate resources: absent appeal to the content of revelatory claims, it is 
